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Root Causes of Recurrent Catastrophe: 





 Peru has experienced a long history of disasters linked to the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO), including during the global El Niño events of 1982-83 and 1997-98. This 
history has contributed to progress in ENSO forecasting and preparation, as well as broader 
development of the country’s disaster risk management (DRM) capacities. Despite such 
advances, in early 2017 Peru was devastated by a localized “coastal El Niño” event. This study 
examines why the 2017 event proved so catastrophic, especially given Peru’s substantial 
preparations for the 2015-16 global El Niño a year earlier. To address this question, the analysis 
applies a disaster forensics approach grounded in the in erdisciplinary lens of political ecology. 
Drawing upon historical and institutional analysis and stakeholder interviews, the study describes 
how the geophysical characteristics of El Niño events i teract with the extensive exposure and 
vulnerability of Peru’s population and infrastructure to produce high levels of disaster risk. The 
study then examines the contemporary institutional context for DRM in Peru and describes 
recent measures to address El Niño-related risks specifically. While acknowledging challenges to 
DRM linked to El Nino’s geophysical attributes, the analysis locates crucial root causes of Peru’s 
recent El Niño disasters in socio-political and institutional characteristics—including 
centralization, sectoral division, and corruption—and describes how these factors undermine 
efforts to develop more integrated and robust DRM capa ities. The analysis concludes with 
recommendations for conducting forensic studies of the political ecology of disaster in other 
contexts. 
 
Keywords: disaster risk management (DRM); disaster forensics; El Niño–Southern Oscillation 





In January 2017, Peruvian society was caught off-guard by the rapid development of a 
“coastal El Niño” event that brought heavy rainfall and widespread flooding to the northern and 
central reaches of the country’s Pacific slope. By late April, this unforeseen event would become 
the country’s worst disaster in two decades, affecting more than 1.7 million people and leading 
to billions of dollars in damages and more than 130casualties (INDECI 2017). Soon after the 
event’s impacts began, the President of Peru’s Council of Ministers, Fernando Zavala, described 
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the situation as “anomalous” and stated that “definitively, we are not prepared as a country for 
this type of event” (República, 2017a)1.  
 
History, however, shows that while “coastal El Niño” events are comparatively rare, 
catastrophic disasters linked to the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) are a recurrent feature 
of Peru’s past (e.g. Seiner, 2001). Most recently, El Niño disasters of a similar severity to the 
2017 event impacted the country in 1982-83 and in 1997-98. Since the 1997-98 event, Peru has 
substantially improved its El Niño monitoring and forecasting capabilities and has expanded the 
resources dedicated to disaster risk management (DRM) in efforts to address risks linked to El 
Niño as well as the country’s high levels of seismic activity, recurrent droughts, and other 
hazard-producing phenomena (JICA, 2014). As a result, Peru’s risk governance policies and 
institutional frameworks are currently well aligned with international recommendations for 
DRM, including those of the United Nations’ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 (UN, 2015). 
 
In this context of increased governmental action and expenditure in the DRM sector and 
improved capacities for confronting recurrent El Niño events specifically, this article examines 
why the 2017 event proved so destructive for Peru. To explore this question, we couple a 
stakeholder-focused, disaster-forensics approach with the critical historical and institutional lens 
of political ecology. Rejecting the idea of “natural” disasters, this political ecological approach 
locates the root causes of environmental change and disaster risks in political, economic, and 
cultural dynamics that link societies and the biophysical world across geographic and temporal 
scales (e.g. Blakie 1985; Watts 1983a). We apply this analytical perspective to the interacting 
components of El Niño-related disaster risk (i.e. hazard, exposure, and vulnerability), and to the 
contemporary institutional arrangements for risk reduction and DRM in Peru. Our analysis 
suggests that, while the 2017 event was anomalous in some ways (Rodríguez-Morata et al., 
2018), the critical drivers of the ensuing disaster w e underlying problems of exposure, 
vulnerability, and ineffective institutions that have persisted—and in some cases worsened—in 
Peru over recent decades despite widespread awareness of their contributions to disaster risk. 
Specifically, we underscore how enduring political entralization, sectoral divisions, and 
                                                        
1 All translations by authors. 
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widespread corruption have allowed, and in some cass facilitated, the growth of exposure and 
vulnerability that undermines the nation’s ongoing efforts to improve DRM capacities. We also 
highlight the substantial implementation gap between P ru’s DRM policies and institutional 
framework and the systems that exist on the ground.  
 
The article is developed in the following manner. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of 
theoretical and conceptual perspectives on disaster ri k, political ecology, and forensic 
approaches to the study of disasters, and then outlines the methodological approach and data 
used in the article. Section 3 examines El Niño-related hazards, exposure, and vulnerability on 
Peru’s Pacific slope, and Section 4 describes the institutional structure and recent innovations of 
Peru’s evolving DRM system. Section 5 outlines the principal measures taken to prepare for the 
forecasted 2015-16 El Niño and surveys the characteristics and impacts of the unexpected 2017 
event. Section 6 then provides a discussion of our key findings, and the concluding section 
reviews several lessons from the Peru case relevant to forensic investigation of disaster risk in 
other settings. 
 
2. Interrogating the Interacting Drivers of Disaster 
 
2.1 Political Ecologies of Disaster Risk 
   
Nearly three decades of focus on disaster risk reduction (DRR) led by the United Nations 
has catalyzed significant national-level political ommitment and institutional innovation 
centered on DRR. Nevertheless, disaster losses in economic terms continue to increase at the 
global scale, averaging US$ 250-300 billion annually by 2015 (UNISDR, 2015). And while 
some countries have seen promising declines in disaster-related mortality, these gains remain 
highly uneven with both mortality and economic losses resulting from high-frequency, lower-
severity disasters (i.e. extensive risks2) continuing to increase in low- and middle-income 
countries (UNISDR, 2015). Making this situation worse, the effects of climate change are 
                                                        
2 “Extensive risks are those that are most closely associated with underlying drivers, such as environme tal 
degradation, social and economic inequality, poorly planned and managed urban development and weak or 
ineffective governance” (Oliver-Smith et al., 2016, 5). 
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expected to contribute to rising disaster impacts and losses in many settings in the future (IPCC, 
2012).  
 
In response to the pervasive challenges disasters continue to pose to livelihoods and 
economies around the globe, the S ndai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 
establishes a set of guiding priorities to reduce disaster risk while better integrating disaster 
resilience into mainstream development (UN, 2015). These priorities are: 1) understanding 
disaster risk, 2) strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk, 3) investing in 
disaster risk reduction for resilience, and 4) enhancing disaster preparedness for effective 
response and to “build back better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (UN 2015). 
The Framework’s first priority, understanding disaster risk, is inarguably the foundation upon 
which the remaining priorities must be developed, and thus crucial to the entire process of risk 
reduction.  
 
While seemingly straightforward, understanding the major drivers of disaster risk in 
specific contexts is complex and has led to enduring critiques of mainstream DRM perspectives 
that view disasters primarily as an outcome of extreme geophysical phenomena exogenous to the 
social-ecological systems in which they occur (Hewitt, 1983; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 1999). 
Political ecological perspectives in particular have emphasized the fallacy of the idea of 
“natural” disasters, instead underscoring the role of power-laden and uneven social relations and 
their interplay with the natural components of systems (Watts, 1983b; Blaikie et al., 1994). Work 
in many contexts has built on these perspectives to show how disaster risk is an outcome of 
geophysical phenomena and associated hazards interacting with social, cultural, political, and 
economic factors that produce differential levels of exposure, vulnerability, and resilience to 
these hazards (e.g. Pulwarty and Riebsame, 1997; Pelling, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004; Oliver-




Although political ecology and other interdisciplinary approaches3 have contributed to 
increased recognition of the diverse drivers of disaster risk in mainstream DRR planning and 
development (UN, 2005; UN, 2015), experts continue to note that “geophysical and geotechnical 
understanding is rarely brought together with social profiles of risk and response” and “the 
separate and interactive roles of natural and human drivers [of disaster risk] are still not 
adequately understood”  (IRDR, 2011, 12-13). In light of this ongoing challenge to 
understanding the interacting components of disaster ri k, the development and application of 
inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches grounded in the socio-environmental dynamics of 
specific empirical contexts remain crucial to advancing effective risk analysis and management 
(Oliver-Smith et al., 2016). 
 
2.2 Disaster Forensics 
 
Disaster forensics has emerged as one such integrated approach to systems-focused 
disaster risk analysis. The forensics approach4, as outlined by the Forensics Investigations of 
Disasters (FORIN) research project, aims at understanding “the middle ground between the 
geophysical ‘trigger’ events and the response” in order to identify factors influencing “major 
policy choices” for risk reduction as well as “the many everyday incremental decisions and 
social and cultural practices, beliefs and perceptions that shape the resilience and vulnerability of 
communities” (IRDR, 2011, 8). Rather than focusing exclusively on the dynamics of individual 
disaster events and response efforts (although this is an important analytical component of the 
research process), disaster forensics is concerned with identifying the root causes of disaster risk 
and response capacity in specific settings over time. To examine these long-term drivers, the 
FORIN project proposes a systems-focused, interdisciplinary approach that integrates physical 
science perspectives on triggering events and enviro mental conditions with social science 
perspectives on factors including institutional and organizational features, political economic 
structures, and governance arrangements (Oliver-Smith et al., 2016). Notably, forensics research 
as envisioned by the FORIN project also entails careful attention to distributional issues and 
                                                        
3 For example, the “climate affairs” approach advocates careful attention to the interplay of social and natural 
dynamics and has been applied to analyzing El Niño impacts both in Peru and more broadly (e.g. Glantz, 2003; 
Ramírez 2019). 
4 Proponents of the approach use the word f ensic to “signify systematic, probing, and dispassionate inv stigations, 
rather than suggest links with morbidity, post-mortems, or criminal detective work” (IRDR 2011, 8).
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inequalities in access to both material and immaterial resources, including decision-making 
capacities and the broader power dynamics in which su  capacities are embedded (Oliver-Smith 
et al., 2016).  
 
The FORIN project’s disaster-forensics approach has given rise to and influenced a 
variety of systems- and event-focused disaster analyses and frameworks in recent years (e.g. 
Fraser et al., 2016; Masys, 2016; Schröter et al., 2018). The emphasis of these studies ranges 
widely as does the degree to which each adheres to the FORIN approach and methods. Here, we 
engage in greater detail with one such framework and application, the Post Event Review 
Capability (PERC) developed by the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance (Venkateswaran et al., 
2015). In brief, PERC is a systematic framework for disaster-event analysis that examines how a 
specific hazard event produces a disaster by evaluating “successes and failures in the 
management of disaster risk prior to the event, disaster response and post-disaster recovery” and 
“identifies future opportunities for intervention/action that could reduce the risk posed by the 
occurrence of similar, future hazard events” (Venkateswaran et al., 2015, 4). PERC analyses rely 
heavily on semi-structured interviews with DRM experts and stakeholders affected by the 
disaster in situ, who are typically identified through snowball sampling methods. Approximately 
a dozen PERC analyses have been undertaken to date, and a meta-analysis covering seven of 
these studies provides an overview of crosscutting hemes and lessons (Keating et al., 2016)5.  
 
The following analysis of El Niño-related disasters in Peru takes the PERC methodology 
as a point of departure but incorporates a detailed historical and political ecological perspective 
on the creation of vulnerability and on processes of policy formation and institution building. In 
this way, our analysis is closely aligned with the focus on root causes proposed by the FORIN 
project, and underscores the need for thorough empirical attention to the diverse and interacting 
drivers of disaster risk.  
 
2.3 Methods and Data 
 
                                                        
5 See: <https://www.zurich.com/en/corporate-responsibility/flood-resilience/learning-from-post-flood-evnts> 
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 This analysis, which expands upon findings from two recent studies of El Niño-related 
impacts in Peru (French and Mechler, 2017; Venkateswaran et al., 2017), is based on a 
combination of desk-based research and interview-focused fieldwork. The desk-based 
component entailed the collection and analysis of formal laws, policies, plans and institutional 
frameworks; information on institutional websites; press coverage of DRM activities and disaster 
events; meteorological and hydrological data; and peer-reviewed and gray literature. The field 
component included semi-structured and unstructured int rviews, site visits, and field 
evaluations with government, private-sector, and NGO officials involved in DRM at local, 
regional, and national levels in Peru; interviews and informal conversations with professionals, 
researchers, and citizens involved in varied aspect of DRM in Peru, and interviews with 
stakeholders directly impacted by El Niño-related hazards in 1982-83, 1997-98, and 2017 in the 
regions of Piura, La Libertad, Ancash, and Lima. 
 
3. Key Components of El Niño-related Risk in Peru: Hazards, Exposure, and Vulnerability 
 
3.1 El Niño and Related Hazards in Peru 
 
The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a coupled oceanic-atmospheric 
phenomenon in the tropical Pacific that produces variations in wind patterns, sea-surface 
temperatures, and precipitation levels over an approximately 2-7 year timescale and is credited 
with being the planet’s strongest source of inter-annual climate variability (Cane, 2005; 
McPhaden et al., 2006). ENSO is best-known for the eff cts of its warm phase, El Niño, which is 
characterized by a weakening of the easterly trade winds and warmer than normal sea-surface 
temperatures (SST) in the central to eastern reaches of the equatorial Pacific along with an 
associated decline in the upwelling of cold, nutrient-rich waters off the western coast of central 
South America (Quinn et al., 1987; Trenberth, 1997). These anomalously warm SSTs off the 
northern and central Peruvian coast often—but not always—drive enhanced convection that 
produces heavy rains and flooding in this usually arid region, while also displacing the vast 
anchovy schools that are the cornerstone of the region’s fishery (Caviedes, 2001; McPhaden et 
al., 2006).  Additionally, during some El Niño years an intensification of the annual rainy season 
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occurs in Peru’s central highlands and along parts of he southern coast while drought conditions 
may develop in the southern highlands (Vuille et al., 2008).  
 
Archaeological and historical evidence illustrates how these El Niño-related phenomena 
have affected Andean and coastal cultures in this region for centuries, if not millennia (Orlove et 
al., 2000; Caviedes, 2001; Seiner, 2001; Dillehay and Kolata, 2004). The heavy precipitation 
characteristic of severe El Niño years is particularly destructive on the Pacific slope through a 
combination of the direct impacts of rainfall on vulnerable infrastructure, riverine flooding, and 
debris flows (known locally as huaicos) that are triggered by flash flooding in steep, unstable 
terrain. In the 1997-98 El Niño, for example, intens  rains (34%), flooding (23%), and huaicos 
(18%) accounted for 75% of the 1301 total emergency events reported (CAF, 2000). While the 
entirety of the Pacific slope may be impacted by these phenomena, intense rains and flooding are 
typically most severe in the northern departments of Tumbes, Piura, and Lambayeque, while 
huaico impacts are most prevalent in the steeper terrain of the central and southern departments 
of La Libertad, Ancash, Lima, and Arequipa (INDECI, 2015). 
 
Although El Niño events are recurrent and forecasting capabilities have improved 
considerably over the last several decades (Chen et al., 2004), the onset, duration, and intensity 
of specific events remain impossible to predict precis ly (Glantz, 2015) and the spatial and 
temporal variability of impacts between different events is high (Cane, 2005; Takahashi and 
Dewitte, 2016). For example, in Peru the 1982-83 and 1997-98 events differed substantially in 
their impacts, with only the former causing severe drought in the southern highlands and only the 
latter causing heavy rains and flooding on the central coast (CAF, 2000; Velasco-Zapata and 
Broad, 2001). More recently, the 2015-16 El Niño, which featured positive Oceanic Niño Index 
(ONI)6 values slightly stronger than the 1997-98 event, was predicted to bring severe impacts to 
Peru, but instead produced relatively moderate effects in only a few regions of the country 
(INDECI, 2015; Ramírez and Briones, 2017). This variability and uncertainty inherent to El 
                                                        
6 The Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) tracks 3-month averag sea surface temperatures (SST) in the east-central Pacific 
Ocean between 120o-170o W longitude (the Niño 3.4 region). To calculate ONI, the average SST in the Niño 3.4 
region is calculated and then averaged with the values from the previous and following months. The resulting three-
month average is then compared to a 30-year average and the observed difference between these values is the ONI 
value for a specific 3-month period; when the index is +0.5oC or higher, El Niño conditions exist (Dahlman, 2009). 
As occurred in 2017, the ONI index is not always a reliable predictor of El Niño-like conditions in coastal Peru, 
leading Peruvians to develop their own “Coastal El Niño Index” (Ramirez and Briones, 2017).  
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Niño creates significant challenges for forecasting, public communication of risks, and the 
disaster readiness of policymakers, risk managers, and broader society (Glantz, 2015). 
 
Even less predictable than global ENSO dynamics are those of the so-called “coastal El 
Niño” phenomena (El Niño costero), including the localized events of 1925 and 2017 that
occurred during seasons when ONI values were near neut al (Rocha, 2011; Takahashi and 
Martínez, 2019; Ramírez and Briones, 2017; Rodríguez-Morata et al., 2019). The 2017 event 
specifically featured rapid warming of SSTs off thenorthern-central Peruvian coast in late 
December and early January, eaching a peak of 5-6°C above average in some locations at the 
end of January (ENFEN, 2017; Garreaud, 2018). This rapid warming and the associated onset of 
extreme precipitation in the absence of anomalously high ONI values surprised both Peruvian 
and international forecasters, as well as emergency response systems. Post-event analysis of 
rainfall levels between January and March 2017 illustrate that precipitation “exceeded the 90th 
percentile of available records (1981-2017) over much of the northern and central coasts of Peru, 
the Andean region, and Amazonia” and were comparable only to 1982-83 and 1997-98 
(Rodríguez-Morata et al., 2019, 5605). The event was especially unusual as it occurred in the 
year following a very strong global El Niño (Rodríguez-Morata et al., 2019), and explanations of 
its causes are still emerging (Garreaud, 2018; cf. Takahashi and Martínez, 2019).  
   
The influence of climate change on the frequency and intensity of future El Niño events 
creates additional uncertainty for DRM. Despite sustained scientific inquiry, little consensus has 
emerged over how global warming will affect the diverse oceanic and atmospheric conditions 
that drive ENSO, and whether climate change will ultimately enhance or dampen the 
phenomenon and its impacts (Collins et al., 2010). Recent research with grave implications for 
disaster risk, however, predicts a doubling in the frequency of extreme El Niño events globally 
under even 1.5°C of warming, with this increased prevalence continuing for up to a century after 
the stabilization of global mean temperature (Cai et l., 2014; Wang et al., 2017). With regards to 
event intensity, analysis of precipitation levels in Peru during early 2017 indicates that rainfall 
amounts “unprecedented (i.e. 100th [percentile])” in the observational record (1981-2017) 
occurred at 16 gauge stations on the country’s north coast and west Andean slope during 
January, February, and March (Rodríguez-Morata et al., 2019, 5611). Relatedly, respondents in 
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our study from the regions of Lima and La Libertad (Central Andes) described the occurrence of 
unusually intense, short-duration rainfall events (i.e. over hourly time frames) that contributed to 
some of the worst huaico and flash-flooding impacts in these areas. While such limited 
observations should not be interpreted as indicative of trends, they do highlight the importance of 
continued investigation and analysis of event impacts t local scales. Moreover, regardless of 
continuing uncertainty about climate change’s long-term influence on El Niño, recent events 
underscore the urgent need for permanent disaster readiness in regions like western Peru where 
events are recurrent—and may arrive without forewarning—and where exposure and 
vulnerability to El Niño-related hazards is pervasie.  
 
3.2 Exposure to El Niño-Related Hazards on Peru’s Pacific Slope  
 
 In late 2015, in the context of a developing El Niño with ONI values similar to those of 
1997, Peru’s National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI) conducted an analysis of the 
country’s El Niño-related hazard exposure. Using inputs including topographic and demographic 
data, reports of hydro-meteorological emergencies between 2003-15, and precipitation records 
and emergency statistics from the 1997-98 El Niño event, the analysis concluded that 
approximately 9.4 million residents (almost a third of the country’s total population), 39,000 
schools, 6,000 health facilities, and nearly 20,000 km of improved roads featured high levels of 
exposure to damage from a significant El Niño (INDECI, 2015).  
 
Much of this exposure to El Niño-related hazards is concentrated on the country’s Pacific 
slope, where rapid urban population growth and infrastructural expansion have occurred over the 
last several decades. This region’s settlement patterns and the resulting hazard exposure are 
strongly influenced by both physical geography and hy rography. The Pacific slope consists of 
an arid coastal plain that receives negligible preci itation during most years and the adjoining 
steep western side of the Andean escarpment, which is characterized by a seasonal hydrologic 
regime with substantial precipitation and surface-water flows in most areas restricted to the 
tropical rainy season (~December-March) (ANA, 2015). The region is divided into 62 major 
watersheds, which contain numerous tributary catchments (known locally as quebradas). On 
average, Peru’s Pacific slope receives only 1.8% of the nation’s total freshwater reserves despite 
sustaining approximately 65% of the country’s population and 80% of its annual economic 
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production (ANA, 2015). There is thus high dependence on very limited water resources, and 
much settlement and infrastructure development is concentrated near major water sources (e.g. 
adjacent to river courses or in flood plains), often without attention to the periodic hazards 
generated by the low-probability, high-damage events of severe El Niño years (CAF, 2000; 
Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001).  
 
Western Peru’s geophysical characteristics, however, ar  but one of the factors 
contributing to its high levels of El Niño-related hazard exposure (Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 
2001; Trigoso Rubio, 2007; Ramírez, 2019). Also crucial are the social and institutional 
conditions that have long supported settlement and development in hazard-prone areas despite 
the impacts of recurrent disasters. A fundamental elem nt in this ongoing growth in exposure has 
been the rapid and often unplanned character of Peru’s u banization process: between 1950 and 
2010 the percentage of the population living in urban areas increased from 41% to 77%, with 
roughly a third of the country’s population now cone trated in the capital of Lima alone 
(Calderón et al., 2015). This process of rural to urban migration intensified in the 1980s and 
early 1990s in the midst of widespread violence linked to internal conflict and severe economic 
crisis, which constrained resources and policy focus for urban planning  (Seminario and Ruiz, 
2008). Additionally, neoliberal reforms in the 1990s facilitated the rise of export-oriented 
agricultural operations in several parts of the country’s coastal plain, which led to the 
establishment of large-scale irrigation infrastructure and new residential areas, often in hazard-
prone settings (Eguren, 2006).  
 
With Peru’s strong economic recovery in the early 21st century, growing urban 
economies have continued to drive high demand for residential and commercial real estate in 
increasingly densely populated areas. A lack of zoning measures and a generally permissive 
official stance on informal land occupation has allowed the development of numerous urban and 
peri-urban settlements (asentamientos humanos) in hazard-prone spaces, including along 
periodically flooded watercourses and huaico-exposed hillsides (Calderón et al., 2015; León 
Almenara, 2017; Seminario and Ruiz, 2008) (Figure 1). The settlement of these areas is 
frequently orchestrated by land-trafficking mafias who plan coordinated group “invasions” that 
are more difficult for authorities to control than isolated land occupations by individual 
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households (Hawley et al., 2018; Seminario and Ruiz, 2008). Despite the illegality of these 
invasions, municipal governments and other authorities responsible for providing land titles and 
certificates of possession to homeowners often support such occupations through formal 
recognition of tenancy or ownership (Calderón, 2013). With this recognition, households can 
legally connect to public services and utilities (Calderón et al., 2015); and, as communities 
become permanently established and expand, public institutions such as schools and health 
centers may locate nearby. Moreover, once established, t e relocation of even the most severely 




Figure 1: Peri-urban settlement in a huaico-exposed valley outside Lima, Peru. Credit: Soluciones Prácticas 
 
3.3 Vulnerability to El Niño in Peru 
 
In simple terms, vulnerability can be understood as susceptibility to harm from exposure 
to a specific hazard. While this broad definition may be adequate for describing the physical 
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vulnerability of critical infrastructure, it does not sufficiently capture the complexity of social 
vulnerability. Overlapping with the concepts of resili nce and adaptive capacity, social 
vulnerability has been defined in the context of natur l hazards as “a measure of both the 
sensitivity of a population to natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover from the 
impact of hazards” (Cutter and Finch, 2008, 2301). Social vulnerability is frequently associated 
with quantitative measures of poverty; yet, while poverty is closely linked to vulnerability in 
many contexts, it does not account for other important material and social relations that can 
significantly reduce or amplify both sensitivity to harm and response capacity (Turner, 2016). In 
this research, we conceive of social vulnerability n relational terms, recognizing how it is shaped 
by both material factors and the broader social structu es and dynamics in which entities (e.g. 
individuals, households, communities) and their daily ctions are embedded (Sen, 1981; Watts, 
1983b; Bohle et al., 1994; Oliver-Smith, 2004). This perspective stresses the inherent 
heterogeneity of vulnerability among groups and populations, even at very fine scales (e.g. the 
household), as well as the importance of interdisciplinary approaches and detailed empiricism for 
analyzing the mutualistic and systemic character of vulnerability’s linked material and social 
drivers and outcomes (e.g. Mark et al., 2017). 
3.3.1 Physical Vulnerability 
 
 Peru’s physical infrastructure in both urban and rural spaces has expanded substantially 
in recent decades (Webb, 2013), but the characteristics of much of this growth have made critical 
infrastructure highly vulnerable to the impacts of extreme El Niño events and other disasters 
(Table 1) (CAF, 2000; Caviedes, 2001; Velasco-Zapat and Broad, 2001). The majority of 
construction in the country occurs informally and without building codes or supervision, 
especially in the residential sector, where estimates suggest 70% of buildings are informal (La 
República, 2018a). Inexpensive, locally sourced building materials such as adobe brick, woven 
fiber (esteras), and cane reinforced with stucco (quincha) are common in rural areas and 
asentamientos humanos (Trigoso Rubio, 2007; Calderón et al., 2015). These materials are highly 
susceptible to damage from heavy rainfall and flooding; but, given the typical aridity of western 
Peru, even improved homes may not be built to withstand such impacts. Structural damages have 
also plagued facilities providing critical public services, including health posts and schools, 































2,600 km. of  
highway damaged,  
47 bridges destroyed  
 
3,136 km. of  
highway damaged, 
370 bridges destroyed 
 
13,311 km. of  
highway damaged, 




98,000 homes destroyed, 
111,000 homes damaged 
 
 
42,342 homes destroyed, 
108,000 homes damaged 
 
63,802 homes destroyed, 





875 schools damaged 
 
956 schools damaged 
 




260 health posts damaged 
 
580 health posts damaged 
 













Table 1: Recorded El Niño-related impacts to Peru’s population and infrastructure in the events of 1982-83, 1997-
98, and 2017 (INDECI, 2016; INDECI, 2017). 
 
 
Water and sanitation networks are also extremely vulnerable in many contexts. Intake 
and treatment infrastructure for both irrigation and potable water systems must often be located 
in flood-exposed watercourses, and water-transport infrastructure (e.g. canals, aqueducts, and 
pipes) frequently traverses steep, erosion-prone hillsides or may be located on bridges or in 
watercourses where it is vulnerable to high flows (CAF, 2000; Ferradas, 2000). In the 2017 
event, potable water provision was interrupted for days at a time in many locations, including in 
the major urban centers of Lima and Trujillo (La República, 2017b). Surface-water drainage 
networks and sanitation systems—where they exist at all— often suffer from a lack of regular 
maintenance, which predisposes them to clogging and overflow during periods of heavy runoff 
(MVCS, 2016). Compounding direct damages to infrastructure, flooding impacts on the water 
and sanitation sectors contribute to a range of secondary impacts linked to contaminated drinking 
water supplies, standing water, and mud and dust that remain after flood waters have receded. 
These include outbreaks of water- and mosquito-borne diseases including malaria, cholera, 
dengue, and leptospirosis along with increased prevalence of skin and eye infections, especially 




Peru’s road network, which has grown substantially over recent decades (Webb, 2013), is 
also highly vulnerable to El Niño-related hazards. Both asphalt and dirt roads in the Andean 
foothills and highlands traverse steep and unstable terrain and cross or run in close parallel to 
major watercourses. On the coastal plain, road and bridge infrastructure may be built to 
withstand the precipitation and stream-discharge lev ls associated with low-intensity flood 
events but has failed catastrophically under the conditions of more severe El Niño events (CAF, 
2000; Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001). Damages in the transportation sector often compound 
impacts in other sectors due to problems of isolated populations and restricted access (CAF, 
2000; Ferradas, 2000; Ramírez, 2019). In the 2017 event, at least 20% of the nation’s principal 
highways suffered significant damages, and movement alo g the Pan-American highway and 
other major north-south connectors was interrupted in several locations due to bridge failures, 
complicating evacuations and relief efforts (La República, 2017c). 
 
In many settings, the extreme vulnerability of criti al infrastructure has long been 
recognized, and plans for improvements have been developed but not implemented. For example 
in the northern cities of Piura, Sullana, and Lambayeque, urban planning processes identifying 
physical risks and potential mitigation strategies were conducted after the 1982-83 El Niño 
event, but their recommendations were never implemented, leading many of the same areas to be 
heavily damaged in the 1997-98 event (CAF 2000; Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001)7. Similar 
patterns occurred in many regions affected by the 1997-98 event and again by the 2017 coastal 
El Niño. In the wake of the 2017 event, a nationally led reconstruction effort has developed plans 
for comprehensive risk-reduction activities, including basin-level drainage projects and the 
fortification and relocation of infrastructure located in high-risk zones (e.g. La República, 
2018b). Nevertheless, effective implementation of such plans remains a long-term challenge as 
the government has struggled to meet even the basicneeds of displaced populations more than a 
year after the triggering event (Peru, 2018).  
 
                                                        
7 In some cases, infrastructure failures during extreme El Niño events have led to improvements. Velasco-Zapata 
and Broad (2001), for example, describe the effectiv  redesign of the highway linking Piura and the port of Paita, 




3.3.2 Social Vulnerability  
   
 Supported by high levels of foreign investment andrelatively stable prices for primary 
exports, Peru’s economy has experienced impressive growth over recent years, with an average 
expansion of 6.5% between 2005-2012 (Mendoza Nava, 2015). This growth has generated both 
employment and substantial tax revenue and has contributed to increased public spending, 
infrastructure development, and service provision. For 2017, national figures for the percentage 
of the population experiencing monetary poverty wasreported at 21.7%, showing a decline of 
more than 20 percentage points since 2007 (INEI, 2018). Non-economic indicators of wellbeing 
such as life expectancy, years of schooling, and access to piped water and sanitation have also 
improved over recent decades (Calderón et al., 2015), and Peru is now positioned in the United 
Nations Development Program’s “high human development” category based on the multi-criteria 
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016). 
 
 These improvements in composite measures of poverty and wellbeing hide high levels of 
inequality, however, including substantial differenc s in poverty rates between urban (15%) and 
rural (44%) areas, as well as the country’s persistently high Gini coefficient (.43 in 2017 down 
from .50 in 2007) (INEI, 2018). Large differences in poverty levels and access to services also 
exist across racial and cultural divisions. For example, in 2016, native Spanish speakers 
experienced a much lower monetary poverty rate (17.8%) than native speakers of an indigenous 
language (32.6%) (INEI, 2017). Additionally, access to ervices such as safe drinking water, 
electricity, and sanitation infrastructure as well as public assistance programs is highly variable 
across the national territory and population (Mendoza Nava, 2015). While such access is 
markedly higher in urban than rural areas, many urban and peri-urban households—especially 
those without proof of property ownership—still lack basic services8.  
 
 Increased financial resources and expanded infrastructure and services have improved the 
basic capacities of governments and many individuals to prepare for and respond to disasters, but 
social vulnerability continues to be exacerbated by a range of structural and institutional factors 
                                                        
8 For example, an estimated 450,000 households in Metropolitan Lima live in districts where average water 
consumption is below the UN’s 50 liter/day minimum requirement for human needs (Mendoza Nava, 2015). 
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(Trigoso Rubio, 2007). Equitable public access to effective and accountable democratic 
institutions remains a particularly critical challenge. This challenge was exacerbated by the 
structural adjustments and political strategies of President Alberto Fujimori’s administration 
(1990-2000), which controlled hyperinflation and internal insurgency but was characterized by 
an extreme centralization of power in the executive branch and the stagnation or decline of 
institutional capacities at other state levels (Crabtree and Thomas, 1998; Velasco-Zapata and 
Broad, 2001). These characteristics built upon Peru’s long history of political and economic 
centralization and undermined nascent efforts to build administrative and fiscal capacities at 
subnational levels (Gonzalez de Olarte, 2004). Since Fujimori’s abrupt downfall in 2000 due to 
corruption and human rights abuses, Peru has renewed its decentralization process. Nevertheless, 
the creation of effective institutions at both national and subnational scales faces continued 
challenges amidst a proliferation of political parties and frequent administrative and policy 
changes and high staff turnover that undermine the consistent protocols, clearly delegated 
responsibilities, and intersectoral collaboration necessary for effective DRM initiatives (Velasco-
Zapata and Broad, 2001; Crabtree, 2006; McNulty, 2011; UN, 2014). 
 
 The governance challenges related to a lack of effective and accountable institutions 
contribute to social vulnerability in diverse ways, including by undermining government’s 
capacity to provide critical infrastructure and basic services, by creating uneven implementation 
of and access to state programs and resources, and by fostering conditions for corruption and 
diminishing trust in public institutions more broadly. Widespread corruption has proven 
particularly problematic in Peru, as bribery and illicit influence can be crucial to accessing basic 
services and fraudulent use of tax revenues and budget allocations for public works have 
undermined service delivery and development efforts in many contexts (e.g. Kaufmann et al., 
2008; La República, 2017c; Nureña and Helfgott, 2019).  
  
4. Peru’s Institutional Context for Disaster Risk Management  
 
Peru’s history of disasters linked to geophysical phenomena (including El Niño events, 
earthquakes, and avalanches and glacier lake outburst floods) has made disaster risk reduction 
and disaster response a national priority in specific regions at various times during the nation’s 
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past (Oliver-Smith, 1986; Seiner, 2001; Carey, 2010). Nevertheless, sustained institutional 
development for DRM did not really begin until the early 2000s, with earlier efforts focused on 
emergency response to individual disasters (UN, 2014). The devastation caused by the 1997-98 
El Niño, even after months of preparation9, underscored the need for more comprehensive and 
effective DRM approaches. In 2005, in-line with theHyogo Framework (UN, 2005) and with 
external funding and technical support, Peruvian policymakers began to debate institutional 
reforms that would expand and decentralize the country’s National Civil Defense System (UN, 
2014). In 2007, the urgent need for such reform was reiterated by challenges in responding to 
and recovering from the 7.9-magnitude Pisco earthquake (Elhawary and Castillo, 2008).  
 
In 2010, Peru’s National Accord (Acuerdo Nacional) focused its annual policy directive 
on the establishment of a more integrated and decentralized DRM policy10. In early 2011, this 
vision was formalized with the passage of Law No 2966411, which created the National System 
for Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD) and shifted the country’s DRM agenda towards 
more prospective and corrective measures. SINAGERD’s creation also expanded the 
organizational structure for DRM, creating new state entities and formally incorporating diverse 
actors from across governmental levels and sectors (Figure 2).  
 
Under the 2011 legislation, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) heads 
SINAGERD’s governing hierarchy, with support from an inter-ministerial, advisory council 
(CONAGERD) that includes the President of the Republic and nine principal ministries as well 
as the National Center for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN)12. Beneath the PCM, two organizations 
                                                        
9 Forecasts for a strong El Niño permitted the investm nt of US$ 219 million in 700 mitigation projects. Most were 
short-term in nature and many of the recommendations stemming from the 1982-83 El Niño were not implemented 
(CAF 2000; Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001).   
10 The National Accord is a non-partisan, political advisory panel established in 2002 to support Peru’s s stainable 
development and democratic governance through inclusive consultation and dialogue; for the text of the panel’s 
directive on DRM see <https://acuerdonacional.pe/politicas-de-estado-del-acuerdo-nacional/politicas-de-
estado%e2%80%8b/politicas-de-estado-castellano/iv-estado-eficiente-transparente-y-descentralizado/32-gestion-
del-riesgo-de-desastres/>. 
11 For full text of the Law see <https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/ley-qu-crea-el-sistema-nacional-de-
gestion-del-riesgo-de-de-ley-n-29664-605077-1/>. 
12 Although not formally included in the structure outlined by Law No 29664, several government agencies provide 
important climate assessment and weather monitoring and forecasting services relevant to El Niño preparation and 
response. These agencies include the National Geophysical Institute (IGP) and the National Meteorology and 
Hydrology Service (SENAMHI), both of which also participate in the Multisectoral Committee for the Study of El 
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within the Ministry of Defense—known by the acronyms INDECI and CENEPRED—are tasked 
with implementing the technical aspects of DRM policy. The National Institute for Civil Defense 
(INDECI) directs reactive measures including disaster preparation, response, and rehabilitation. 
Reflecting the country’s longstanding focus on emergency response, INDECI has existed in the 
Peruvian bureaucracy for more than four decades and currently has a decentralized presence 
through offices in each of the country’s 26 political regions and through a network of Regional 
and Local Emergency Operation Centers (COERs and COELs). In complement to INDECI, the 
National Center for Estimation, Prevention, and Reduction of Disaster Risks (CENEPRED) 
oversees prospective and corrective measures as well as processes of reconstruction. In contrast 
to the longstanding and decentralized character of INDECI, CENEPRED was established in 
2011 with the creation of SINAGERD, and is a Lima-based institution with a mandate to 
coordinate with subnational governments through DRM working groups. While separate 
responsibilities are formally delimited for the PCM, CENEPRED, and INDECI, substantial 
overlaps in focus and challenges in coordination betwe n these groups have led to critiques of a 
multi-headed system that has not yet achieved functional integration (UN, 2014). In an explicit 
effort to improve the efficiency of the system, theSINAGERD hierarchy was restructured in 
early 2017 through the dissolution of the DRM secretariat within the PCM (whose 
responsibilities were transferred to INDECI) and the consolidation of CENEPRED within the 
Ministry of Defense13. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Niño (ENFEN) that provides permanent monitoring andmonthly reports of ENSO indicators and conditions (French 
and Mechler, 2017).  






Figure 2: Institutional actors and structure of Peru’s National System for Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD). 
 
 
The fact that many crucial DRM processes are tasked to specific governmental ministries 
rather than INDECI or CENEPRED adds further complexity to SINAGERD’s functioning. 
These ministries feature their own internal governing structures and institutional cultures; and 
while high-level councils such as the PCM and CONAGERD support inter-ministerial 
integration, respondents emphasized that achieving coordination in the day-to-day activities of 
distinct sectoral bureaucracies remains complex and incomplete. One important example of these 
coordination challenges can be seen in the planning and zoning processes to prevent occupation 
of hazard zones. While the National Water Authority (located within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Irrigation) is responsible for delineating buffer zones (faja marginal) around watercourses, 
which are some of the foremost hazard zones in the country, responsibility for landscape-scale 
planning and zoning processes (ordenamiento territorial) are divided between the Ministry of the 
Environment and the Ministry of Housing, with the former tasked with processes of territory-
wide “ecological and economic zoning” in conjunction with regional governments and the latter 
focusing on development in urban contexts. Notably, each of these zoning processes remains 
disarticulated from the others and only partially implemented at the national scale. Relatedly, in 
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2012, Law No 2986914 was passed to regulate the relocation of populations inhabiting zones of 
immitigable risks. This legislation establishes the formal process through which the 
determination of immitigable risks and subsequent voluntary or involuntary relocation should 
occur, designating specific responsibilities to local and regional governments, to CENEPRED 
and INDECI, and to the Ministry of Housing. Since its passage, however, the law has seen little 
implementation and, in at least one setting, has been r sisted by residents15.   
 
Despite SINAGERD’s centralized hierarchy, the system is founded on a subsidiarity 
principle that considers regional and local governme ts as the principal executors of DRM 
activities. Accordingly, DRM decisions should be made at the lowest level possible, and 
national-level authorities should only intervene when capacities at local and regional levels are 
surpassed. Under the law, DRM working groups instituted by governments at regional and local 
levels are tasked with evaluating disaster risks and social vulnerabilities and developing 
strategies for their reduction, while emergency disaster response is directed by INDECI’s 
decentralized COERs and COELs—together these subnational entities replace the Civil Defense 
Committees that existed prior to the 2011 legislation. Reiterating findings from earlier studies, 
many of our respondents underscored problems stemming from the fact that although the law 
recognizes and formalizes the crucial role of subnatio l actors in DRM, these groups remain 
insufficiently resourced and underdeveloped across the national territory (Velasco-Zapata and 
Broad, 2001; Elhawary and Castillo, 2008; UN, 2014).  
  
Additional groups included formally in SINAGERD include the Armed Forces and 
National Police, who play key roles in disaster response. In very general terms, the law also 
formally includes the “participation of private entities and civil society” and mentions a range of 
examples including universities, the corporate sector, NGOs, and volunteer organizations like the 
Red Cross. In practice, these groups play important oles in many contexts, with diverse NGOs 
contributing to preparedness and response measures through local-level engagements, and the 
                                                        
14 For full text of the law see <https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/ley-de-reasentamiento-poblaci nal-
para-zonas-de-muy-alto-rie-ley-n-29869-794288-2/> 
15 In the Municipality of Chosica, authorities declared the neighborhood at the foot of the Carosio quebrada as a 
zone of immitigable risk, ordering the relocation of ~140 households. Most of the population refused to be relocated 
(La República, 2016), however, and preceding the 2015-16 El Niño the National Water Authority installed 
geodynamic barriers to mitigate huaico impacts in the area (ANA, 2016). 
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corporate sector investing substantially in disaster-risk reduction activities to protect assets prior 
to disasters as well as supporting response activities. 
  
 The Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF) oversees varied fiscal mechanisms to 
support SINAGERD’s DRM agenda. These include recurring annual budget allocations designed 
to fund prospective and corrective measures at all levels of government, funds obtained from 
taxes on mining-sector profits (canon minero) to be used for relocation of at-risk populations, 
and contingency funds, contingent credit lines, and  fiscal stabilization fund for expenses related 
to specific disaster events (Ferro, 2016). The most important DRM-specific financing 
mechanism is the budget program PP 068 for the Reduction of Vulnerability and Attention to 
Disaster Emergencies (PREVAED). This fund is available to national, regional, and local-level 
governments for a wide array of DRM measures. Although the resources available through PP 
0068 have risen dramatically since the program’s inception in 2011 (Ferro, 2016), many 
respondents emphasized the need to improve government capacities to access and implement 
activities under PP 0068 and related programs, especially at subnational levels.  
 
The MEF may also redistribute budgetary allocations r mobilize a range of contingency 
funds to support short-term preparatory measures and disaster response. In past El Niño events 
and other disasters, these actions have often occurred nder formal “declarations of emergency”, 
which may predate the actual disaster event, as occurred in both 1997-98 and 2015-16. While 
emergency declarations function to expedite the provisi ning of funds for disaster preparation 
and response, they also relax many formal controls and auditing procedures on the use of public 
funds. As a result, there is heightened potential under such conditions for the misuse of funds, 
and respondents across governmental levels emphasized the prevalence of ethically questionable 
practices and spending inefficiencies during these periods.   
 
In summary, recent DRM efforts in Peru have been characterized by institutional 
development and restructuring coupled with increasing fiscal allocations. Broadly speaking, 
these developments are well aligned with leading DRM policy prescriptions at the international 
scale (e.g. the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks). Yet, while guiding policies and the definition of 
key actors and roles are thoroughly articulated in legislation and institutional frameworks, 
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substantial shortcomings in terms of actual organizational capacities continue to undermine the 
efficacy of Peru’s DRM system. These shortcomings were underscored by the widespread 
devastation and difficulties in response during andfter the 2017 coastal El Niño event, 
particularly given the significant preparations for a global El Niño event just a year earlier. To 
shed further light on the strategies and limitations f Peru’s evolving DRM institutions, the 
following section examines preparations for the 2015-16 El Niño as well as the impacts of the 
2017 coastal event. 
 
5. Uncertainty and Surprise: the Challenges of El Niño in Peru during 2015-16 and 2017 
 
5.1 Preparations for the 2015-16 El Niño 
 
Forecasted months in advance and heavily publicized in local and international media, 
the 2015-16 global El Niño provided an opportunity for extensive coordination of DRM 
measures in Peru. In July 2015, ONI-based predictions of a potentially extreme El Niño later that 
year triggered Peru’s central government to declare p ts of 14 exposed regions under a state of 
emergency. Over the next several months, additional declarations of emergency would include 
89% of all municipalities and 77% of all districts in the country, permitting the rapid dispersal of 
funding to these regions for preparatory measures (INDECI, 2016). An ad-hoc National Council 
for Management of El Niño Risk (CONAGER-FEN) was created to supervise preparation and 
response activities supported by fiscal allocations f ~US$ 1.5 billion (CONAGER-FEN, 2015). 
 
 To a great extent, Peru’s preparations in 2015 replicated and extended the DRM 
strategies employed prior to the 1997-98 El Niño event (CAF, 2000; Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 
2001). In particular, the Ministries of Agriculture and Housing along with regional governments 
were allocated major funding for clearing accumulated debris and opening channels in exposed 
watercourses and reinforcing protective structures such as levees and retaining walls. The 
Ministries of Housing, Health, Education, and Transport meanwhile received funding for repairs 
and improvements to vulnerable physical infrastructure (e.g. water and sanitation systems, 
schools, health posts and hospitals, and roads and bridges) (CONAGER-FEN, 2015). Given the 
vulnerability of many water and sanitation systems, the Ministry of Housing also provided 
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financing and loans totaling almost US$ 20 million t  local service providers for the relocation 
and reinforcement of treatment plants and other infrastructure, as well as the cleaning of sewage 
systems and storm-water drains (MVCS, 2016). With support from the private sector, the 
Ministry of Housing also supplied eight portable water treatment systems, five drain-cleaning 
systems, and cistern trucks to departments that had suffered potable water shortages and related 
disease outbreaks during the 1997-98 event (MVCS, 2016). In one high-profile example of new 
infrastructure development, the National Water Authority installed 22 steel geodynamic barriers 
in valleys outside Lima to protect populations exposed to huaicos (ANA, 2016) (Figure 3)16. 
 
 
Figure 3: Geodynamic barriers in the Carosio quebrada of Chosica, Peru. Credit: Soluciones Prácticas.  
 
                                                        
16 These geodynamic barriers, which were not activated during 2015-16, became the focus of significant criticism 
from local officials and residents due to their high costs (~ US$ 330,000 each). During the 2017 event, however, 
many of the barriers were activated, capturing large debris and preventing huaico-related deaths in downstream 
communities. Authorities have since called for the expansion of this technology throughout the national territory. 
See previous note. 
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In complement to these environmental and infrastructu e-focused measures, state 
authorities and civil society organizations at various levels undertook activities to support public 
preparedness and response. Much of this action involved material preparations, including 
stockpiling food, emergency kits, medicines, and other basic supplies in areas likely to be 
impacted. INDECI took a leading role in much of this work, coordinating with regional 
governments, and in some cases the private sector, to expand storage facilities for emergency 
supplies. Additionally, modular buildings to provide 500 temporary residences and 2000 
temporary classrooms were acquired by the Ministries of Housing and Education respectively 
and distributed to exposed regions (MVCS, 2016). INDECI and CENEPRED, with support from 
the National Water Authority, also created maps of high-risk zones and evacuation routes that 
were hosted on open, online platforms17. Groups including INDECI, the Volunteer Firefighters 
Association, and various NGOs working directly with civil society organized response brigades, 
emergency drills and simulations, and trainings in the functioning of Early Warning Systems 
(EWS) and the processing of the post-disaster Evaluation of Damages and Analysis of 
Necessities (EDAN) forms, which are a critical step for the dispersal of governmental aid to 
affected populations.  
 
 In the end, while the 2015-16 El Niño event led to severe effects in some parts of the 
world, the impacts in Peru were far less than expected (Ramírez and Briones, 2017), 
underscoring the uncertainty and variability that challenges efforts to forecast and prepare for 
individual El Niño events (Glantz, 2015). As a result, it is difficult to evaluate directly the 
effectiveness of the preparations undertaken for the event in 2015 and early 2016. Moreover, it is 
uncertain how the much publicized forecasting and widespread anticipation of a severe event that 
never came to fruition may have impacted El Niño-related risk perceptions and future actions of 
both policymakers and the general public in Peru (cf. Glantz, 2015). The surprise coastal event of 
2017, however, provided a test of the country’s readiness for a severe El Niño just a year after 




                                                        
17 See <http://sinadeci.indeci.gob.pe/VisorEvacuacion/index.html> and <http://sigrid.cenepred.gob.pe/sigrid/>  
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5.2 Impacts of the 2017 Coastal El Niño  
 
 In stark contrast to the global El Niño of the year before, the localized event of 2017 
developed rapidly and without forewarning in Peru (Ramírez and Briones, 2017). In late January, 
heavy rainfall first triggered multiple huaicos in valleys adjacent to Lima, followed by 
widespread flooding in the north of the country. On February 3, the national government 
declared a state of emergency in the northern departments of Piura, Tumbes, and Lambayeque 
due to flooding (La República, 2017e). Impacts worsened in northern and central Peru through 
April, with the most intense periods of rain and flooding in mid to late March in most areas. 
Many of the rivers that had been cleared and channelized a year earlier overflowed their banks or 
levees, flooding parts of major urban centers including Piura, Chiclayo, Tumbes, Trujillo, 
Chimbote, and Huarmey. Potable water, drainage, and s itation systems in these and other cities 
were overwhelmed by water, debris, and related infrastructure failures leading to cascading 
impacts on the transportation, energy, education, healt , and agriculture sectors (La República, 
2017f).  
 
According to respondents, emergency response efforts in many settings were hampered 
by coordination and communication problems between governmental sectors and across levels, 
including a lack of clarity around roles and responsibilities and inefficient and delayed dispersal 
of both emergency funds and relief supplies (Venkateswaran et al., 2017). As occurred in the 
response to the 1997-98 El Niño (Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001) and the 2007 Pisco 
earthquake (Elhawary and Castillo, 2008), national-level authorities often superseded their 
regional and local-level counterparts, generating inter-level conflict and redundancy in efforts. 
As the event worsened, the country’s military forces were increasingly mobilized and relied upon 
for emergency relief, despite a lack of familiarity with local contexts and aid allocation 
(Venkateswaran et al., 2017). Broadly, the event underscored that many of SINAGERD’s 
innovations, including the development of subnational DRM working groups, emergency 
contingency plans, and a multi-level system of articulated Emergency Operation Centers (i.e. 




As the event weakened by mid-late April, an estimated 1.5 million people had been 
affected, with direct economic losses estimated at approximately US$ 3.1 billion (Peru, 2018). 
By early May, the Ministry of Economy and Finances had approved $US 6.4 billion for 
reconstruction over the following three years (PCM, 2017). This process was formally titled 
“Reconstruction with Changes,” to acknowledge the importance of avoiding the re-creation of 
vulnerabilities that have persisted since the El Niño disasters of 1982-83 and 1997-98. 
Reconstruction efforts, however, have been delayed nd undermined by problems of inter-level 
governmental conflict and corruption (Peru, 2018), and in late 2019 authorities indicated that 
planned reconstruction and rehabilitation activities otaling more than $US 7.5 billion were 




 The coastal El Niño event of 2017 inarguably overwhelmed Peru’s disaster-response 
systems, despite recent innovations in DRM policy and institutions as well as substantial 
investments in El Niño-focused risk reduction a year earlier. Our analysis of the event and the 
broader DRM context in Peru, however, underscores that the severity of this disaster should not 
be attributed to an anomalously extreme geophysical event. While the physical characteristics of 
the triggering event were important elements of the disaster and warrant careful analysis, we 
locate the principal root causes of the disaster in socio-cultural and political conditions that 
persist in Peru despite the nation’s growing DRM emphasis. Acknowledging the role of 
institutional factors, Peru’s Minister of Defense at the time of the event stated that the 
government itself was “the disaster” in reference to its shortcomings in emergency response (La 
República, 2017g). Rather than focusing on proximate causes such as ineffic encies in response 
and reconstruction efforts, however, we identify root causes as longer-term, structural factors 
that perpetuate outcomes such as limited emergency-response capacity, infrastructure failures, or 
“poverty” broadly defined. While these factors are too diverse to address comprehensively here, 
we focus our discussion on several aspects of Peru’s contemporary socio-political and 
institutional context that contribute fundamentally to undermining urgently needed progress in 
disaster risk governance: high levels of centralization, lack of functional articulation between 




With the downfall of the Fujimori administration in2000, Peru began a concerted process 
of rebuilding its democratic institutions at subnational levels (Crabtree, 2006; McNulty, 2011). 
Despite this ongoing effort, administrative authority and fiscal resources continue to be highly 
concentrated at the national level, reflecting the continuation of a longstanding domination of the 
nation’s political and economic spheres by Lima-based authorities and institutions (Gonzalez de 
Olarte, 2004; McNulty, 2011). In the DRM sector, this centralization contributes to an enduring 
implementation gap between a policy framework premis d on the subsidiarity principle and 
multi-level institutional structures and the reality of many subnational locales’ lack of autonomy 
and incipient DRM capacities18. Similar implementation gaps exist across Peru’s institutional 
landscape and can be attributed in part to the influe ce of internationally funded development 
processes that promote the “‘implanting’ [of] homogenous models of legislative and institutional 
systems” in diverse contexts where political will as well as capacities and dedicated resources for 
implementation are insufficient (Lavell and Maskrey, 2014, 11; French, 2016). Many of our 
respondents noted this implementation gap as a critical challenge, but explanations for its causes 
varied. Respondents working in national-level institutions, for example, frequently identified the 
limited capacities and frequent turnover in subnational governments as an obstacle to 
SINAGERD’s implementation, while respondents at regional and local levels often stressed 
inadequate financial and technical support from natio l-level institutions as well as a lack of 
fiscal autonomy that undermined rapid and adaptive resource allocation, especially for 
emergency response (cf. Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001). Not surprisingly, respondents and 
analysts from civil-society organizations highlighted the combined effect of challenges at all 
levels of government as well as conditions unique to specific regional settings (UN, 2014). 
Examples from diverse contexts and sectors underscore the long-term character of 
decentralization initiatives and the crucial importance of devolving power and sharing resources 
in ways that enable independent and accountable democratic institutions at lower levels (e.g. 
Ribot, 2002). In Peru’s DRM sector, the legislative and institutional architecture for such 
                                                        
18 Evaluation of the current system suggests that subnational capacities are developing— for example, working 
groups have been established in all 26 regional governments although progress at municipal levels has been more 
gradual. Respondents were careful to clarify that the formal establishment of these working groups does not ensur  
effectiveness or even sustained action on their part. According to our evaluations, the central-level directors of 
SINAGERD (e.g. PCM, CENEPRED, and INDECI) could do m re to orient the continued actions of these working 
groups after their initial formation (cf. UN 2014). 
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decentralization appears to be in place, but much work remains in building and empowering 
effective and robust institutions at subnational leve s. 
 
In addition to being highly centralized, Peru’s governmental structure features numerous 
ministries with separate institutional bureaucracies whose policies and responsibilities often 
overlap without clearly defined processes for integration, prioritization, or the avoidance of 
redundancy. These conditions create a “state machine …[whose] core is afflicted with disorder 
and dispersion” and where “turf wars, conflict, and competition are the daily bread” between, 
and at times within, sectors (Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001, 187). In the context of the 
country’s DRM agenda, our respondents stressed how a lack of cooperation and clarity over 
responsibilities between institutional “silos” signficantly complicates intersectoral integration. 
While SINAGERD’s formal hierarchy includes an inter-ministerial advisory council 
(CONAGERD), functional linkages between the nation’s specialized DRM institutions and other 
sectors, especially at subnational scales, remain underdeveloped (UN, 2014). Consolidation of 
DRM-focused institutions within the Ministry of Defense in early 2017 was explicitly 
undertaken to improve the efficiency of SINAGERD and address the dispersion of 
responsibilities, but our respondents and other analyses have suggested that this reconfiguration 
overwhelmed INDECI’s existing capacities and sowed confusion in the midst of the emerging 
coastal El Niño disaster (Peru, 2018).  
 
Concurrent to more effective decentralization and intersectoral collaboration, our 
respondents stressed a need for a political and cultural shift towards treating DRM as a 
prospective endeavor with long-term social benefits ra her than a discrete response to individual 
emergencies. Such a shift requires more thorough integration of DRM activities into the national 
development agenda as well as into policymakers’ and residents’ day-to-day decision-making. 
Currently, such change is forestalled by a prevailing focus on development initiatives that 
generate high-visibility outcomes over time horizons corresponding to electoral cycles (e.g. 
public infrastructure such as roads, plazas, and sports facilities) rather than long-term 
investments that offer less—or even undermine—politica  capital for elected officials (e.g. 
relocation of exposed populations and infrastructure). This challenge is not unique to Peru; as 
Lavell and Maskrey suggest, “very few politicians, ationally or locally, have won an election on 
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a platform of reducing future disaster losses and risks” (2014, 10)19. Instead, our respondents 
noted that in some cases Peruvian elected officials have intentionally failed to enforce 
regulations that support DRM in order to cultivate political support, for example through the 
granting of certificates of property possession in hazard zones occupied by land invasions or 
through opposing state-led relocation of exposed populations. Moreover, there is currently little 
political incentive to dedicate resources to improve institutional capacities for prospective DRM. 
This situation is made worse by the tendency for newly lected governments to fill professional 
ranks with their own supporters, leading to frequent staff turnover that undermines the 
development of DRM expertise and institutional memory (Elhawary and Castillo, 2008; Peru, 
2018).  
 
A widespread lack of progress in implementing long-term, prospective DRM approaches 
was highlighted by both the preparations for the 2015-16 El Niño and the reconstruction efforts 
after the 2017 event. For example, in 2015-16, as in 1997-98, preparedness activities focused on 
urgently clearing watercourses and reinforcing exposed infrastructure (CAF, 2000; Velasco-
Zapata and Broad, 2001; CONAGER-FEN, 2015). Yet in the years in between these events, little 
action was taken to reduce El-Niño related risks, and respondents suggested such measures 
would have been more effective had they been conducte  on a routine basis rather than in the 
few months preceding the predicted onset of a severe event or once impacts had begun. Repeated 
damages to particular locations and critical infrastructure systems across multiple El Niño events 
also underscore how earlier lessons regarding the need for planning and zoning policies to reduce 
settlement and asset development in exposed areas have not yet been taken up in many contexts 
(Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001; Peru, 2018). The focus of the current reconstruction process 
on infrastructure repair and activities like river channelization continues to raise questions 
regarding the sustainability of such temporary measures versus long-term strategies including 
relocating exposed settlements and infrastructure. It is notable that this emphasis on short-term, 
infrastructure-focused responses over more transformative socio-cultural and institutional change 
has long prevailed in Peru, contributing to a persistent accumulation and expansion of disaster 
                                                        
19Although prospective DRM measures are not typically  political boon, there are cases of politicians using disaster 
response activities to generate popular support. Velasco-Zapata and Broad (2001), for example, emphasize how the 
Fujimori administration’s preparation and response effort for the 1997-98 El Niño was highly personalized and 
tightly controlled by the executive branch in support of the administration’s clientelist agenda. 
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risk in settings impacted by El Niño and other hazard-producing phenomena (Doughty, 1999; 
Velasco-Zapata and Broad, 2001; Peru, 2018). 
 
In addition to the challenges outlined above, widespr ad political corruption remains one 
of the most significant and intractable issues currently undermining transparent and effective 
governance across political levels and sectors in Peru. Although corruption has long been 
endemic to Peruvian politics (Quiroz, 2013), its current extent has recently been highlighted by 
the country’s involvement in the wide-reaching, inter ational scandal “Operation Car Wash” 
(Lava Jato) and by the indictment and incarceration of numerous high-profile figures, including 
multiple former Presidents, regional governors, andmembers of Congress and the national 
judiciary (Durand, 2019; Nureña and Helfgott, 2019). The effects of corruption on the DRM 
sector can be seen in varied ways, including in the formal sanctioning of illegal land invasions in 
hazard-prone spaces and in the impacts of graft on infrastructure development and disaster-
reduction activities. In numerous public-works and DRM projects, embezzlement and a lack of 
oversight and adherence to building standards have led to abandoned works in-progress or rapid 
deterioration and sudden failure of public infrastruc ure, including schools and hospitals, water 
and sanitation systems, and roads and bridges (e.g. La República, 2017d). Respondents also 
underscored the susceptibility of short-term, risk-eduction activities (such as watercourse 
clearing and channelization) to corrupt practices due to the difficulties in verifying factors such 
as the extent of area treated and the amount of time worked or fuel used by heavy machinery. 
Such problems reportedly worsen significantly under formal declarations of emergency when 
spending controls are relaxed and the contracting of third-party operators often leads to 
substantially elevated costs. Recognizing the prevalence of such practices, President Pedro 
Kuczynski resisted a nation-wide declaration of emergency in early 2017 explicitly to avoid 
“opening the door to corruption” (La República, 2017h). Although Operation Car Wash has 
provided an important impetus to confront and address Peru’s deeply entrenched political 
corruption (Durand, 2019), the corruption crisis continues to undermine the “Reconstruction with 
Changes” process through questionable practices and distraction of resources and political focus 







Disasters linked to geophysical phenomena such as El Niño never merely result from 
exogenous “natural” hazards impacting society, but instead stem from root causes associated 
with both the hazard-producing phenomena and the socio-cultural contexts in which disasters 
occur. In this paper, we have argued that detailed forensic investigation of disaster events 
grounded in the interdisciplinary approach of political ecology is particularly well suited to 
understanding these complex and interacting root causes. To conclude, we offer several 
recommendations from our analysis of El Niño in Peru r levant to forensic investigations of 
disaster in other contexts.  
 
First, we stress that addressing the complexity inherent to multi-level social and 
institutional systems requires stakeholder engagement and analysis across the various levels and 
sectors of government and society. As our interviews with Peruvian authorities and citizens 
highlighted, perceptions of the major challenges to DRM initiatives varied significantly across 
governmental levels and, to a lesser degree, between public sectors and geographic regions. 
Obtaining a broad sample of perspectives from these different sources is vital to understanding 
both intra-governmental and inter-cultural dynamics as well as the varied ways in which disaster 
risk is perceived and addressed by diverse stakehold rs with highly variable levels of expertise, 
experience, and resource access.  
 
A second recommendation concerns the need to examine formal laws and policies in 
conjunction with the realities of their implementation in varied contexts to understand how 
institutional development is operationalized on the ground. As the Peruvian case highlights, the 
implementation gap between the country’s official DRM policies and quotidian practices 
remains substantial in many settings due to a combination of overarching and locally specific 
challenges. Such implementation gaps are common in contexts of both the Global North and 





Third, we highlight the important—and underexplored—role of political corruption in 
undermining efforts to reduce disaster risk and improve risk governance (Alexander and Davis, 
2012). While political corruption is increasingly acknowledged as a pervasive problem at the 
global scale, its investigation remains both difficult and potentially dangerous in most contexts, 
and as a result, discussion of its influences are frequently omitted from otherwise detailed 
analyses. Although we have only broached the complexity of the topic here, we argue that a 
failure to address the influence of corruption as a root cause of disaster risk in a context like that
of contemporary Peru leads to incomplete and potentially misleading explanations. 
 
Last, we stress the need for detailed interdisciplinary analysis of the geophysical 
conditions and processes that interact with social root causes to shape disaster risks. In the 
Peruvian case, this includes considering how geographic and hydrographic factors contribute to 
high levels of exposure and interact with socio-cultural and political-economic conditions to 
accentuate vulnerability and resulting disaster risk for particular groups. Additionally, our 
research underscores the importance of the high levels of uncertainty around the dynamic and 
interacting physical drivers of the El Niño phenomenon and related hazards, as well as how these 
may evolve under climate change in the future. This uncertainty demands continued 
investigation of both global- and local-scale geophysical processes and their interactions with 
highly specific geographic and social contexts. Finally, communicating the complexity and 
uncertainty inherent to phenomena like El Niño to br ader society through effective scientific 
interpretation and careful event forecasting remains  critical challenge in many contexts 
(Glantz, 2015; Ramírez and Briones, 2017). 
 
Finally, taken together these recommendations suggest several characteristics crucial to 
robust forensic analysis of disasters. First, this approach requires thorough and sustained 
empirical engagement in affected contexts. Working across governmental levels and sectors and 
engaging with a diversity of stakeholders in multiple locations requires substantial time and 
significant financial and human resources. These demands underscore the value of partnering 
with local experts who have vital contextual understanding and personal and institutional 
networks that can facilitate detailed empirical research. Moreover, incorporating careful analysis 
of underlying—and often sensitive—political and cultural dynamics (e.g. intersectoral conflicts 
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or corruption) in a forensic investigation will likely extend the time, in-depth contextual 
knowledge, and contacts and networks required. Attention to the interactions between complex 
geophysical and social processes also necessitates integrating varied disciplinary approaches and 
research capacities, which will often be most effectiv ly achieved through collaboration. In light 
of these requirements, we suggest that forensic investigation of the root causes of disaster risk 
should be approached as a long-term interdisciplinary, empirical engagement. Perhaps most 
importantly, if such research efforts are to have meaningful influence on DRM institutions and 
decision-making, they will require significant investment in building dialogue and trust with 
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